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In

INTRODUCTION

recent years, Chinese lawyers, judges, and ordinary citizens have rallied in widespread opposition to the Chinese
government's use of "laojiao" forced labor camps to punish
non-criminal behavior. In response to this mounting pressure,
the central government revealed plans to eliminate the laojiao
labor camp system following the Third Plenum of the 18th
Party Congress held in November 2013.1 Although announced
intentions of abolishing this relic of Maoist repression is a welcome development, such reform would not address the more
fundamental injustice of officially sanctioned arbitrary detention that underpins the laojiao system. Beyond laojiao labor
camps, Chinese police also routinely send political dissidents
and alleged petty criminals to other types of equally arduous
detention facilities without according them genuine due process
protections.
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than a nominal change: the perpetuation of the same jail under
a different name.

Meaningful reform aimed at tackling this broader underlying issue would require enhancing the authority of the judiciary
relative to public security forces in China's system of law
enforcement. Moreover, this power transfer must coincide with
the establishment of a judicial system committed to upholding
substantive rule-of-law principles. Such restructuring, however,
would require overcoming immensely powerful political resistance and altering fundamental guiding principles of China's
criminal justice system. Anticipated reform proposals that fall
short of these necessary adjustments represent nothing more

THE LAOJIAO AND ARBITRARY DETENTION IN CHINA
LABORING FOR STABILITY: THE LAOJIAO AS A TOOL OF
REPRESSION

The Chinese Communist Party's forced labor camp system
has long served as a primary component of governmental efforts
to maintain political stability. 2 Modeled after the Soviet Union's
infamous gulag, 3 Mao Zedong established "laogai" (reform
through labor) labor camps to punish convicted criminals4 and
"laojiao" (re-education through labor) labor camps to incarcerate so-called class enemies and petty criminals without the time
and evidentiary burdens of a trial.5 Although laogai sentences
theoretically carried a fixed term, 6 laojiao inmates originally
served terms of indefinite duration.7 In 1979, however, authorities limited laojiao sentences to four years, which has remained
the maximum term of confinement.' In response to pressure
to abolish reform-through-labor, authorities ostensibly ended
the laogai system in 1994 by changing the name of these labor
camps to "prisons" (jianyu).9 The government has continued,
however, to openly use laojiao camps to incarcerate suspected
petty criminals and political dissidents without presenting any
evidence of criminal wrongdoing.
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Recent, high-profile laojiao sentences have sparked public
outcry over China's persistent use of forced labor camps to
2
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punish non-criminal behavior. One case involved a woman
who received an eighteen-month laojiao sentence after publicly
criticizing local police who failed to adequately investigate
serious crimes committed against her eleven-year-old daughter, including kidnapping, rape, and forced prostitution.10 The
Chinese public also rallied behind Ren Jianyu, a twenty-fiveyear-old civil servant who received a two-year laojiao sentence
after criticizing disgraced politician Bo Xilai on Weibo, China's
equivalent of Twitter. 1 In a perceived attempt to calm potentially
destabilizing unrest, a number of central government officials
began calling for a re-examination of the laojiao system in early
2013.12 In November 2013, the central government formally
announced plans to abolish the laojiao labor camp system.

This supremacy of mere police regulations over constitutionally
enshrined protections and duly enacted law exemplifies the
public security authorities' dominance over the judiciary and
procuratorate in the administration of criminal justice in China.
In regards to the second category of arbitrary detention outlined by the UNWGAD, the UDHR and the ICCPR classifies
the following basis for imprisonment as amounting to arbitrary
detention: receiving information or expressing ideas through
any medium, manifesting religious beliefs, exercising the right
to move freely and establish residence within the state, and
peacefully assembling. Chinese authorities, however, routinely
detain people for making political statements, expressing certain
religious beliefs, traveling to Beijing to petition the central government, and organizing public protests. 21 In addition to defying
these international norms, incarcerating individuals for exercising fundamental human rights violates protections incorporated
in the Chinese Constitution. 22

BEYOND LAOJIAO: INSTITUTIONALIZED ARBITRARY
DETENTION IN CHINA

Although eliminating the laojiao serves as a victory over a
particularly reviled tool of repression, treating laojiao abolition
as a significant step toward aligning the Chinese criminal justice
system with international human rights norms misses a larger
point: the laojiao is only one component of China's vast system
of arbitrary detention institutions." Ending this specific form of
imprisonment would not eliminate the broader practice of detaining individuals in gross violation of international standards.
The UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention (UNWGAD),
the UN body charged with investigating cases of arbitrary detention, established three separate categories of arbitrary detention.
First, the deprivation of liberty without any possible legal basis.
Second, the deprivation of liberty in response to the legitimate exercise of certain freedoms enshrined in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).14 Third, the
failure to observe international norms related to a fair trial,
resulting in "such gravity as to give the deprivation of liberty an
arbitrary character."15
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Related to the third category of arbitrary detention, the UDHR
and ICCPR also embody international norms related to criminal procedure protections that guard against arbitrary detention.
Although China has not ratified the ICCPR, it did sign the ICCPR
with intent to ratify at a later date. At the very least, China's status as
a signatory obligates it to "refrain from acts which would defeat the
objects and purpose" of the ICCPR.2 3 Additionally, the UNWGAD
explicitly referenced fair trial protections enshrined in the ICCPR
when it determined that Chinese authorities arbitrarily detained an
individual after failing to provide adequate due process protections
during trial.24 In accordance with the UDHR and ICCPR, defendants are entitled to the following procedural protections: (1) the
presumption of innocence, (2) a public hearing before an independent and impartial tribunal, (3) legal counsel of his or her choosing,
(4) free legal counsel if indigent, (5) adequate time and resources to
prepare a defense and communicate with legal counsel, and (6) to
examine and obtain evidence from adverse witnesses. As discussed
later in this article, the extent to which China's criminal procedure
framework fails to provide defendants with these basic due process
protections often amounts to arbitrary detention.

With regard to the first category of arbitrary detention outlined by the UNWGAD, deprivation of liberty without legal
basis, Chinese authorities routinely incarcerate dissidents and
petitioners in black jails-a catch-all term for extrajudicial
detention centers-without offering even a pretext of legal
justification. 16 In addition, Chinese police apply cursory and
highly discretionary procedures to impose prolonged sentences, thereby compromising protections enshrined in the
Chinese Constitution, Administrative Punishments Law, and the
Law on Legislation. The Constitution, for instance, prohibits
arrest without prior authorization from a court or the People's
Procuratorate. 17 Furthermore, the Administrative Punishment
Law requires that procedures for administrative punishment
are just, open, and based on facts, and that the punishment is
proportionate to the degree of social harm inflicted.18 The Law
on Legislation mandates that only the Standing Committee of
the National People's Congress may pass laws under which an
individual may be deprived of his liberty, a power that may not
19
be delegated to other governmental entities.

ADMINISTRATIVE DETENTION IN CHINA
BLACK JAIL OR WHITE JAIL,
DETENTION

Despite these foundational protections, police regulations
provide quasi-legal cover for authorities to detain individuals
for years in abusive facilities without initiating criminal proceedings or even providing evidence of criminal wrongdoing. 20

So

LONG AS IT IS ARBITRARY

Beyond laojiao labor camps, current administrative arbitrary detention methods include soft detention,2 5 law education
3
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centers, 26 psychiatric hospitals, 27 "shuanggui" detention, 28 drug
rehabilitation centers, and "black jails."29 Despite having different names, these institutions share a number of defining characteristics. Most importantly, the decision to confine people in
these facilities is issued administratively, meaning it is delivered
in the absence of judicial oversight. In practice, this means that
individuals are often incarcerated at the whim of public security
forces in violation of Chinese law and international arbitrary
detention standards. 30 Sentences in these facilities range from a
few days to a number of years. Just like in laojiao labor camps,
inmates in many of these detention centers are reportedly subjected to forced labor and physical abuse. 31

MPS. The extensive presence of MPS officials serving in senior
positions in the central government38 and the amount of money
allocated to domestic security forces, which exceeds military
expenditures, demonstrates the tremendous power of the public
security forces. Political restructuring during the 2013 National
People's Congress only enhanced the power of public security
officials in the central government and strengthened the Party's
commitment to maintaining social stability. 39 In light of these
realities, Chinese human rights experts have described the MPS
as a primary obstacle to ending arbitrary detention in China.

In line with the Party's overriding concern with maintaining
societal stability, many of these administrative detention institutions were established to appease mounting pressure to end or
reform problematic detention facilities of the past. For example,
in 2003, the central government outlawed custody and repatriation centers in response to public outrage over the death of a
migrant worker in custody. In place of these facilities, police
established black jails to detain petitioners. 32 Likewise, since
2008, the Chinese government has purportedly ended the practice of sending drug users to laojiao labor camps, instead placing
addicts in "more humane" drug rehabilitation centers. 33 Rather
than representing a shift toward providing greater due process
protections, "patients" in these facilities are still incarcerated at
the discretion of public security organs for a minimum sentence
of two years. 34 Moreover, several human rights organizations
assert that inmates in drug rehabilitation centers are forced to
labor under conditions nearly identical to circumstances in labor
camps.35 In provinces that have already phased out labor camps,
many laojiao facilities have simply been transformed into drug
rehabilitation centers. 36 In October 2013, lawyer Tang Jitan traveled to a law education center, another recently invented detention facility, to visit a client only to find that the facility was just
an extension of a laojiao labor camp, perhaps forecasting what
awaits many current laojiao inmates. If history is any indication,
abolition of the laojiao will likely coincide with increased reliance on alternative forms of arbitrary detention.
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Attempts to end prolonged administrative detention would
also encounter intense opposition from local governments.
As with other state institutions, the Communist Party exerts
control over the PSB and its subordinate offices through tiaokuai ( iA) governance, an interlocking system of vertical (tiao)
control from higher level administrative bodies and horizontal
(kuai) control from local Party committees. 40 Within the public
security system, the (tiao) hierarchy flows from the MPS at the
central government level to the PSB at the provincial level to
public security offices at the prefecture level. As such, a given
PSB office theoretically serves two masters: the MPS (tiao) and
the provincial government (kuai). Although this system enables
the central government to effectively control other state organs
while allowing for a degree of flexibility at the local level, in
the context of police work, this system grants local authorities unbridled power. This power imbalance stems in part from
the need for increased autonomy in order to adequately handle
unique local security challenges, the secrecy inherent in police
operations, and the unmatched coercive power held by public
security organs. Hardly unique to China, Terry Moe, a highly
regarded expert on public bureaucracy, asserts that policing is
the quintessential example of an administrative activity that is
extremely difficult to monitor for local abuses. 41

ARRESTING REFORM: PUBLIC SECURITY FORCES AS A
BARRIER TO CHANGE
Meaningful reform of China's system of arbitrary detention institutions would require stripping public security forces
of their extensive power to impose prolonged detention in the
absence of independent judicial oversight. In order to implement
such changes, reformers would have to overcome overwhelming
resistance from entrenched power at the central, provincial, and
local levels of government.
As a practical matter, the Ministry of Public Security (MPS),
which theoretically administers the Public Security Bureau
(PSB), serves as a formidable political obstacle to ending prolonged administrative detention in China. The MPS views the
use of administrative detention as a valuable security tool.37 In
addition, the state's ability to detain individuals without presenting evidence of criminal wrongdoing preserves the immense
power of the public security apparatus. Threats to the continued
use of administrative detention would frustrate policing efforts
and represent an unwelcome check on the political clout of the

The immense power enjoyed by regional and local public
security forces is also the result of official Communist Party
policy encouraging decentralized control over the police, a
practice rooted in Mao Zedong's directive that "security work
must emphasize Party leadership . . . and in reality accept direct

leadership by Party committees." 42 Although the tiao-kuai
system theoretically vests vertical (tiao) power in higher level
public security administrative bodies, superior police departments one level up are only permitted to "assist" local governments by making "suggestions" that officials are supposed to
4
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Enacted in March of 2012, the CPL prohibits the use of torture
"consider."4 3 Public security departments are strictly bound by
in obtaining confessions, guards against self-incrimination, and
horizontal (kuai) power exercised by Party committees. As a
excludes the use of illegally obtained evidence.4 9 Considering,
result, the central government has less control over local police
however, that law enforcement officials have long relied on such
forces than it does over other administrative agencies governed
practices to secure convictions, it seems highly unlikely that this
by binding vertical (tiao) power.
year-old statute will rein in entrenched abuses of power. The
The reality of public security officials serving almost parallel
power of authorities to override CPL provisions reinforces this
to powerful government officials further exacerbates problems
path dependence. Officials may merely declare that a confesof accountability" According to a 2012 survey, ninety percent
sion was not obtained through coercion.50 Effectively permitting
of provincial police chiefs concurrently served as officials at the
the admission of confessions obtained through police coercion
highest levels of the provincial government, with some holding
invites authorities to intimidate suspects into falsely admitting
45
multiple positions on ruling standing committees. As demonguilt, thereby enabling the jailing of dissidents without concrete
strated by a recent study of budget allocations made by provinevidence of criminal wrongdoing.
cial governments after public security
Perhaps most troubling, the 2012
officials assumed powerful positions,
CPL establishes a dual-track criminal
public security officials who double
as Party committee members oftenIf
justice system; although the new statorces
ute theoretically strengthens protecsubstantively alter government policy
rolonged
tions for individuals accused of ordiin favor of public security interests. 46
More than just formulating policy and
nary crimes, the law does not extend
, the Chinese
these due process rights to individuals
budgets, local government authoriaccused of committing politically senould likely
ties also control the appointment of
local public security personnel, an
crimes. Rather, the CPL authositive the
se courts to
rizes
use of "secret investigations,"
arrangement that ties job stability and
prospects for advancement to loywhich are regulated by undisclosed
entences for
guidelines, to collect and present evialty to local leaders. Such powers of
dence against an individual accused
tfenses.
lo
persuasion undoubtedly make local
of embezzlement, bribery, terrorism,
officials even more likely to defer to
organized crime, drug-related crime,
regional interests that conflict with
or "endangering society." 5 ' The revised CPL also permits
central government policy.47 As such, even if reformers could
authorities to detain alleged criminals under residential surveilovercome resistance to ending arbitrary detention in the central
lance for up to six months at a "designated residence" without
government, instituting such monumental changes at the local
access to counsel in cases that involve terrorism or endangering
level would prove exceedingly difficult.
national security.52 Moreover, law enforcement officials are not
obligated to provide notification of detention to family members
THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM AND ARBITRARY DETENTION
of an accused criminal in such cases when it would "impede the
In addition to curtailing the power of China's public security
investigation."53 In other words, the CPL permits detention in an
forces to impose administrative sentences, eliminating arbitrary
undisclosed location for six months without notification when
detention in China would require significant reform to the
an individual is accused of committing a vaguely defined crime
country's judicial system. In light of the Communist Party's
under equally vague circumstances. As such, the CPL provides
overriding concern with maintaining stability and the lack of
legal cover for authorities to incarcerate dissidents in a manner
due process protections granted to politically sensitive criminal
substantially similar to the unlawful detention methods long
defendants, if security forces were stripped of prolonged detenused by the PS13.
tion powers, the Chinese government would likely increasingly
The CPL also fails to ensure that criminal defendants receive
use courts to impose prison sentences for political offenses.
adequate
legal representation. Although the CPL requires
Truly ending arbitrary detention in China thus requires estabauthorities
to provide access to legal counsel after commencing
lishing a judicial system committed to substantive rule-of-law
defendants routinely go unrepresented in crimiprosecution,
jurisprudence that would adjudicate all cases in which the
proceedings.
In fact, Yu Ning, President of the All China
nal
accused faces prolonged detention.
Lawyers Association, asserted that only thirty percent of criminal defendants actually obtain legal counsel. 54 The seventy perTHE ILLUSION OF DUE PROCESS
cent of criminal defendants who lack access to an attorney likely
do not vigorously challenge the admissibility of evidence proThe existing criminal procedure framework undermines rulehibited under the CPL. In politically sensitive cases, defendants
of-law principles by failing to sufficiently deter official misconare often unable to obtain counsel of their choice, either due to
duct, allowing the presentation of overly prejudicial evidence,
police harassment of prospective attoneys55 or because counsel
permitting prolonged secret detention, and failing to ensure that
is appointed for a defendant against his will.56 Even when a
defendants are adequately represented at trial. Despite winning
defendant retains competent counsel of his choosing, the prosthe praise of some pundits, 418practical application of the 2012
ecution's authority to deny access to adverse evidence in cases
revised Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) falls short of internainvolving state secrets makes it exceedingly difficult to prepare a
tional standards prohibiting arbitrary detention.
d
on attorney-client communication
defense.5 Severe restrictions
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governrer t W
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and the state's power to prohibit a defense attorney from making
judicial power is a greater obstacle to the construction of a rulea court appearance compound problems of adequate represenof-law society than the [tiao-kuai system]." 69 In light of this
tation in state secrets cases. Lawyers who manage to mount a
system of control, judicial empowerment and attendant substandefense despite these obstacles are further constrained by Article
tive rule-of-law reform would require establishing a legal system
306 of the Criminal Code. Referred to as "Big Stick 306," this
free of undue influence from public security forces.
vaguely worded provision outlines harsh penalties for obstructJudicial reform efforts would also entail bolstering ongoing
ing justice and fabricating evidence. 8 Authorities have loosely
efforts to improve the competence of judges and lawyers. As
interpreted Article 306 to punish attorneys who zealously advoa result of heightened professional standards and changes to
cate for political dissidents. 59 As a result of these procedural
judicial promotion procedures, Chinese judges and attorneys are
shortfalls, 99.8 percent of criminal defendants in China are ultifar more capable than their predecessors.70 In fact, the number
mately convicted of crimes,60 making the criminal justice system
of college educated judges increased fivefold from 1995 to
little more than a tool of official repression.
2005.71 Moreover, the institution
of a national bar exam, which had
Beyond these procedural
a fourteen percent passage rate in
deficiencies, crimes outlined in
China's criminal code provide
2005,72 has improved the quality
of legal professionals in China.
authorities with legal cover to
A 2005 Supreme People's Court
impose lengthy prison sentences
for political offenses, in violation
directive urging judges to accurately describe facts and legal
of international standards. Such
arguments in judicial opinions
crimes include terrorism and
offenses falling under the penumthe quality of
has also improved
the decisions. 73 This initiative has
bra of "inciting subversion of the
state," the charge that replaced
reportedly helped some judges
Mao-era counter-revolutionary
external pressure when issuinternationaling
judgments. 7 Despite these
crimes as a primary means to
imprison political dissidents. As
positive developments, nearly
noted by Nicholas Bequilin, a
fifty percent of judges do not
ntal
have a college degree. 75 Arecent
Chinese human rights expert at
Human Rights Watch, authoristudy also indicates that many
judges earned diplomas from
ties often invoke such crimes as
vocational or unaccredited instia pretext to "crackdown on distutions.7 This lack of adequate
sidents, human-rights lawyers,
legal training compromises the
civil-society activists and Tibetan
institutional integrity of the Chinese judicial system, arguably
and Uighur separatists." 6 As an example, authorities sentenced
making judges more susceptible to external influence. In light
Nobel Peace Prize winner Liu Xiaobo to an eleven-year jail term
of these realities, judicial empowerment initiatives must entail
for inciting subversion as punishment for his participation in the
strengthening educational and procedural reforms intended to
Charter 08 Manifesto, a document urging Chinese officials to
foster the development of a legal culture in which trial judges
adopt rule-of-law reforms and permit democratic political parrender verdicts based on legal principle rather than pressure
ties.62 Over the past year, Chinese authorities have only intenfrom political forces or popular demand.
sified efforts to imprison civil society activists who advocate
political reform.63
In effect, legal reform aimed at ending arbitrary detention in
China would represent nothing less than a paradigmatic shift in
the fundamental guiding principles of China's criminal justice
JUDICIAL EMPOWERMENT AND THE RULE OF LAW
system. In contrast to the current overriding goal of maintaining
Party control over the judiciary as a means to maintain
political stability, such reform would entail promoting judicial
political stability is a root cause of the failure of criminal justice
integrity and the rights of the accused. This change would
in Chinese courts.M As with other government institutions in
65
involve transitioning to "rule-of-law" from the current reality of
China, the legal system is governed by the tiao-kuai system.
the Party's practice
trule-by-law,"
of using laws, regulations, and
This enables local governments and superior courts to exercise
66
police orders to impose its will.
tremendous control over lower courts. Moreover, as security

Legal reform ai med at ending
arbitrary detention in China would
represent nothir g less than a
paradigmatic shift ir the fundamental
guiding principl es of China's
criminal justice system. In addition
intenatinalresist
to defying these
norms, incarceratin g individuals for
exercising fundame
human rights
violates protections incorporated in
the Chinese Constitution.

officials invariably outrank legal professionals in China's political hierarchy, the judiciary is subordinate to the directives of
public security officials and their mission of maintaining stability.67 In addition to occasionally influencing criminal verdicts, 68
this power imbalance effectively eviscerates theoretical judicial
authority to review administrative sentences imposed by police.
In essence, it enables Party stability maintenance directives
to supersede the legal authority of judges. According to He
Weifang, a Peking University law professor and preeminent
Chinese legal authority, the "superiority of police power over

CONCLUSION

Abolishing the laojiao labor camp system without addressing
the more fundamental issue of arbitrary detention represents little
more than cosmetic change to a deeply flawed criminal justice
system. At root, meaningful reform would require establishing
a more independent judicial system committed to upholding
surstantive rule-of-law principles that would adjudicate all cases
in which the accused faces prolonged detention. Unfortunately,
6
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not address the underlying practice of incarcerating individuals in
gross violation of international standards. Rather, if history serves
as a guide, the Chinese government will merely use superficial
legal reform as a proxy for meaningful political change.

in light of the challenges outlined in this article-including the
Communist Party's overriding emphasis on maintaining political stability through endowing public security forces with overwhelming political and coercive power-anticipated reform will
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